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We retrospectively investigated two outbreaks of
encephalitis in Meherpur and Naogaon, Bangladesh, which
occurred in 2001 and 2003. We collected serum samples
from persons who were ill, their household contacts, ran-
domly selected residents, hospital workers, and various
animals. Cases were classified as laboratory confirmed or
probable. We identified 13 cases (4 confirmed, 9 probable)
in Meherpur; 7 were in persons in two households. Patients
were more likely than nonpatients to have close contact
with other patients or have contact with a sick cow. In
Naogaon, we identified 12 cases (4 confirmed, 8 probable);
7 were in persons clustered in 2 households. Two Pteropus
bats had antibodies for Nipah virus. Samples from hospital
workers were negative for Nipah virus antibodies. These
outbreaks, the first since 1999, suggest that transmission
may occur through close contact with other patients or from
exposure to a common source. Surveillance and enhance-
ment of diagnostic capacity to detect Nipah virus infection
are recommended.
N
ipah virus is a recently described zoonotic paramyx-
ovirus that causes a highly fatal encephalitis in
humans (1,2). The only previously reported outbreaks of
Nipah virus occurred in Malaysia and Singapore from
September 1998 to May 1999. In Malaysia, 265 encephali-
tis cases, primarily among pig farmers, and a 40% death
rate were reported (3–5). Concurrent outbreaks of a respi-
ratory and neurologic illness caused by Nipah virus
occurred among pigs in the affected areas, and close con-
tact with pigs, especially sick pigs, was the major risk fac-
tor for human infection (3,6). Person-to-person
transmission of Nipah virus was not documented (7). In
Singapore, 11 cases and 1 death were reported among abat-
toir workers who slaughtered pigs imported from affected
areas of Malaysia (3,6). The outbreak was contained by the
mass culling of >1 million pigs, and since then, no other
outbreaks of Nipah virus have been reported in Malaysia
(8). Subsequent investigations identified Pteropus bats as a
possible natural host for Nipah virus (9–11). Pteropus bats
are also believed to be the natural host for Hendra virus, a
zoonotic paramyxovirus that is genetically related to
Nipah virus and has been associated with fatal respiratory
and neurologic illness among persons in Australia (12).
In April and May 2001, a cluster of febrile neurologic
illnesses with nine deaths was reported in a village in
Meherpur District, Bangladesh. Preliminary investigations
by the Bangladesh Ministry of Health and the World
Health Organization (WHO) excluded a diagnosis of
Japanese encephalitis, dengue fever, or malaria, but 2 of 42
serum specimens obtained from village residents in May
2001 showed reactive antibodies to Nipah virus antigen in
tests performed at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC). However, a comprehensive investiga-
tion of this outbreak was not conducted. In January 2003,
a cluster of febrile illnesses with neurologic features and
eight reported deaths occurred in adjoining villages in
Naogaon District, ≈150 km from the village in Meherpur
District. Similarities in the clinical manifestations
observed among patients in Naogaon and Meherpur raised
the question of whether the outbreaks were caused by the
same agent.
In March 2003, we conducted a detailed retrospective
investigation to describe the outbreaks in Meherpur and
Naoganon, characterize their clinical features, and deter-
mine the etiologic agents, presence of asymptomatic infec-
tion, risk factors for infection and disease, and possible
animal reservoirs. 
Methods
The field investigation took place March 6–16, 2003,
and consisted of separate outbreak investigations in
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among healthcare workers in Meherpur Hospital, and an
assessment of possible animal reservoirs in the outbreak
regions. Because of the substantial time lapse between the
outbreak period and the field investigation in Meherpur,
approval for the Meherpur portion of the study was
obtained from the appropriate ethical review committees.
Informed consent was obtained from all participants,
except for children <16 years of age, for whom consent
was obtained from the parent or guardian. Approval for
participation was obtained for children >7 years of age. In
both outbreak investigations, the surveys were conducted
among residents >2 years of age, which consisted of an
oral interview and collection of 10 mL of blood by
venipuncture. Field research assistants used a standardized
data collection instrument to collect information on demo-
graphics, symptoms of illness, exposure to ill patients,
exposure to animals in the surrounding area, and other pos-
sible risk factors. When persons were deceased, an inter-
view was conducted by proxy with a household member.
Interviews were typically completed within 30 minutes.
We attempted to verify clinical information on hospitalized
patients from medical records, but records were either not
found or contained incomplete clinical data.
Meherpur Outbreak Investigation
Apopulation census was performed before the study by
field research assistants, who visited each household and
obtained information on the age and sex of each household
member. Surveys took place in the villages of Chandpur
(population 604), where persons who died or were hospi-
talized had resided, and Sishipara (population 237), an
adjacent village located ≈1/2 km south of Chandpur. We
defined the outbreak period as April 1 through May 31,
2001. Potential patients were identified from lists com-
piled by the initial WHO investigation and from self-
reports of illness by village residents during the outbreak
period. Household members were also surveyed as poten-
tial patients and assessed for clinically compatible illness
or asymptomatic infection. To assess risk factors for infec-
tion, we enrolled controls by using simple random sam-
pling of the numbered population census of remaining
residents to select twice as many controls for each poten-
tial patient.
Naogaon Outbreak Investigation
Surveys were conducted in the adjacent villages of East
Chalksita (population 529) and Biljoania (population 481);
suspected deaths and hospitalizations caused by Nipah
virus infection were reported from both villages. The out-
break period was defined as January 1–31, 2003. Because
the scope of the outbreak was not well-defined, emphasis
was given to case finding, which consisted of a household-
to-household search by the field research assistants to
identify potential cases. A sample of asymptomatic house-
hold members and other village residents, selected by sim-
ple random sampling from an available government
population census, were surveyed for illness and serologic
evidence of infection.
Healthcare Worker Study
A cross-sectional survey was performed at Meherpur
District Hospital, where most of the ill residents from
Chandpur were admitted with encephalitis symptoms. We
interviewed and collected serum samples from healthcare
workers whose job descriptions involved close contact
with patients, such as physicians, nurses, orderlies, and
nursing assistants. Information was obtained on demo-
graphics, symptoms of illness, the degree of contact with
the patient, and type of barrier precaution used during
patient care. 
Serum Sample Collection 
Blood specimens were centrifuged on site, transported
on wet ice, and stored at –20°C. Serum samples were
shipped frozen at –70°C to CDC and tested with an
immunoglobulin (Ig) M capture enzyme immunoassay
(EIA) for detection of Nipah/Hendra IgM antibodies and
an indirect EIA for Nipah/Hendra IgG antibodies (13).
Nipah (Malaysia prototype) virus antigen was used in both
assays.
Data Analysis
Interview data were entered into Epi Info 6.04 (CDC,
Atlanta, GA) and validated and analyzed by using SAS
version 9 (SAS, Cary, NC). Based on serologic results, we
defined a confirmed case as a case in a village resident
with fever, headache, or altered level of consciousness
within the specific outbreak period with antibodies reac-
tive with Nipah antigen. A probable case was defined as a
case in a resident with onset of fever plus headache or
altered level of consciousness during the outbreak period
who died before serum samples could be collected for test-
ing. For the case-control study, univariate analysis was
performed for each risk factor variable. Potential cases,
including those in household members who did not have
cases that met definition for confirmed or probable cases,
were defined as noncases and analyzed together with the
control group.
Assessment of Animal Reservoirs
In both districts, attempts were made to obtain repre-
sentative samples from domestic and wild birds and mam-
mals. Collections were based in part on relative
abundance, suggestions of any history of ill animals indi-
cated by village reports, and the likelihood for human
Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 10, No. 12, December 2004 2083
Nipah Virus Reemergence, Bangladeshcontact. Domestic species were restrained manually, when
possible, or sedated by the intramuscular administration of
ketamine hydrochloride (≈5–10 mg/kg). Traps were set
near village residences for small mammals, such as rodents
and insectivores. Mist netting or hand collections for bats
and birds occurred in and around homes, suspected fly-
ways, roosts, such as abandoned buildings, and likely for-
aging areas, such as fruit plantations. In addition, samples
were obtained from bats captured or killed by local vil-
lagers because they were suspected of feeding on fruit
trees in nearby orchards. In Naogaon, villagers reported
that a herd of pigs was in the vicinity of the village ≈2
weeks before the outbreak. Pigs owned by the same herder
(but not from the same herd) were bled for serologic test-
ing. Animal serum samples and tissue were shipped frozen
to CDC, and all specimens were tested using an indirect
EIAemploying protein A/G conjugate for mammals and an
antibird conjugate for avian species.
Results
Meherpur Outbreak Investigation
In Meherpur, 13 residents, all from Chandpur (attack
rate 2.1%), met the case definition: 4 had confirmed cases
and 9 had probable cases. The outbreak, which spanned 1
month, began with the index patient, a 33-year-old farmer
who had onset of symptoms on April 20, 2001 and died 6
days later. The outbreak ended with the last case which
occurred in a 60-year-old woman, a neighbor of the index
patient, with onset of symptoms on May 20 (Figure A). All
nine persons with probable cases were hospitalized and
died as a result of their illness before laboratory specimens
could be collected (case-fatality rate = 69%). The average
length of illness from onset to death was 6 days (range
3–10 days). All four persons with confirmed cases had IgG
antibodies reactive to Nipah virus antigen (including two
persons that had previous positive results from initial test-
ing in May 2001). IgM antibodies were not detected in any
of the specimens. Six (46%) of 13 patients were male; their
ages were 4–60 years of age (median 38 years). A cluster
of five cases occurred in persons from the same household
as the index patient; the cluster consisted of the index
patient’s wife, son, brother, and sister. Eight separate
households were affected, and 9 of the 13 persons with
probable or confirmed cases were relatives of the index
patient either by blood or marriage. Although patients with
probable or confirmed cases lived in the western half of the
village, no other obvious geographic clustering was noted;
households with no cases were located in between those
with cases.
Of 119 surveys completed in Meherpur, 96 (81%) were
from Chandpur residents. Of these, 15 (16%) were initial-
ly identified as potential cases, 28 (29%) were their house-
hold members, and the remaining 53 (55%) were random-
ly selected as controls. All the patients came from the
group identified as persons with potential cases in
Chandpur; no patients were found among their household
members or the randomly selected controls. The case-con-
trol analysis was restricted to Chandpur residents. With
respect to baseline characteristics, patients (n = 13) did not
differ from nonpatients (n = 83) by sex or occupation, but
patients were older than nonpatients (mean age 40 vs. 27
years of age, p < 0.001). We examined close contact with
patients and contact with animals as potential risk factors
for illness. Persons who lived with or cared for patients
during the time of their illness were more likely to become
patients themselves (odds ratio [OR] 4.80, 95% confidence
interval [CI] 1.23–18.8) (Table 1). In a subanalysis among
those who lived with or cared for patients, no significant
difference was found between patients and nonpatients
with regard to sharing items of a personal nature, such as
toothbrush or utensils, but patients were more likely to
have touched secretions, such as urine or saliva, of other
patients (OR 5.7, CI 1.0–32.7). Among all interviewed res-
idents, patients were more likely than nonpatients to have
had contact with an ill cow (OR 7.9, CI 2.2–27.7).
Although >90% of villagers reported that bats were fre-
quently seen near their homes, patients and controls
showed no differences in contact with bats or other ani-
mals, whether ill or well.
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Figure. Illness onset of probable and confirmed cases of en-
cephalitis. (A) Meherpur District, 2001. B) Naogaon District, 2003.Naogaon Outbreak Investigation
In Naogaon, 12 persons from both villages met the case
definition (attack rate 1.1%): 4 cases were confirmed, and
8 were probable. All cases were found through the reports
of initial deaths and hospitalizations; no patients were
found among asymptomatic family members or randomly
sampled village residents. The index case occurred in a 12-
year-old boy with symptom onset on January 11, 2003, and
the last case occurred in 12-year-old girl on January 28
(Figure B). All but one of the patients were hospitalized
(one died before hospital admission), and all eight patients
with probable cases died (case-fatality rate = 67%); mean
period from onset of symptoms to death was 4 days (range
2–7 days). No diagnostic specimens were available from
the deceased patients. Of the four confirmed patients, all
had IgG antibodies and three had IgM antibodies reactive
with Nipah virus antigen. Eight (67%) patients were male,
and their ages were 4–42 years of age (median 12 years of
age). Clustering of patients occurred in one household, in
which the head of household became ill on January 14 and
later died. Symptoms developed in his wife and three
daughters 2 weeks later; only the two younger girls sur-
vived. Altogether, eight households were affected. As with
Meherpur, no geographic clustering of affected households
was seen, but in contrast to the outbreak in Meherpur,
members of affected households had no blood relationship
to those in other affected households.
Clinical Features of Cases
The typical clinical course was similar in both outbreaks
and began with onset of fever, followed by headache and
varying degrees of diminishing consciousness. In both out-
breaks, a fever was found in all patients, followed by an
altered level of consciousness in 22 (88%) and headache in
18 (72%) (Table 2). Cough (16 [65%]) and difficulty
breathing (16 [65%]) were also common. Vomiting
occurred in half of the patients, but seizures and diarrhea
were uncommon. Although a significant difference was
seen between patients with confirmed and probable cases
only with regard to dyspnea (25% vs. 82%, p = 0.01),
patients with probable cases (all of whom died) tended to
have a higher proportion of all symptoms compared to
patients with confirmed cases, all of whom survived.
Healthcare Workers Study
Atotal of 46 healthcare workers (6 physicians, 20 nurs-
es, 20 ward assistants) participated in the survey; 32 (70%)
reported having contact with at least one of the encephali-
tis patients through the course of direct patient care. Of
those who had direct patient contact, 12 (40%) used barri-
er precautions, such as gloves, masks, or gowns. One
worker had unprotected mucous membrane contact with
secretions of ill patients with encephalitis, and one report-
ed a needlestick injury. Six workers reported an illness
characterized by fever and headache in the period from the
outbreak onset through June 30, 2001, but none reported
mental status changes. None of the participating healthcare
workers had antibodies reactive with Nipah virus antigens.
Assessment of Animal Reservoirs
No cluster of ill animals was observed or reported in
either district. In Meherpur, serum samples were collected
from two pigs and 31 bats, including 25 P. giganteus. None
had antibodies reactive with Nipah virus antigens. In
Naogaon, 50 animals were tested for evidence of Nipah-
like virus infection: 10 birds, 4 pigs, 4 dogs, 2 shrews, 5
rodents, and 25 bats, including 19 P. giganteus. Antibodies
reactive to Nipah virus antigen were detected in two
P. giganteus adult females. Serum specimens from all
other animals were negative.
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In these two outbreaks, antibodies reactive with Nipah
virus antigen were found in seriously ill persons with
encephalitis and antibodies were absent in asymptomatic
persons or those without serious illness. These findings
strongly suggest that Nipah, or a related virus, is the cause
of both outbreaks. Nipah virus–associated illness has not
been previously reported outside of Malaysia and
Singapore. However, in contrast to the outbreaks in
Malaysia, where animal illnesses were reported and close
contact with pigs was strongly associated with Nipah virus
infection in Bangladesh, no obvious zoonotic source has
been identified. Pigs are infrequently found in Bangladesh,
and no animal illnesses or die-offs in or around the affect-
ed villages were reported. Although case-control results
indicated that patients were more likely to have contact
with an ill cow, no such cow was available for testing, and
the associations may have been due to chance. However,
such potential risk factors need to be explored in future
outbreak settings. Because antibodies reactive with Nipah
virus were identified in local Pteropus bats, which rein-
forces previous findings, this genus may serve as the reser-
voir for this group of viruses (9–11). A possible
explanation for acquisition of infection without an obvious
domestic reservoir may be inadvertent direct contact with
bats or bat secretions.
Human-to-human transmission of Nipah virus was not
shown in the Malaysia and Singapore outbreaks (7), but
several findings from the Bangladesh outbreaks suggest
that close contact may have resulted in transmission. In
Meherpur and in Naogaon, clusters of cases occurred with-
in family households, with dates of symptom onset occur-
ring over a range of time. In Meherpur, relatives with close
contact with patients became ill, and handling or exposure
to secretions of patients was found to be a risk factor for
illness. Nipah virus has been detected in respiratory secre-
tions and urine of patients, which suggests that person-to-
person transmission is possible (14). However, we cannot
rule out the possibility that a common source within house-
holds and among relatives may have been responsible for
infection. In contrast, we found no evidence for transmis-
sion of Nipah virus from patients to healthcare workers.
Contact between secretions or blood of healthcare workers
and patients was reported in only two instances, which is
an insufficient number to assess transmissibility through
these routes. However, the lack of symptoms and lack of
detectable antibody to Nipah virus in all hospital staff we
evaluated suggest that transmission from patients to
healthcare workers is uncommon.
The major clinical characteristics described in
Bangladesh were generally similar to the characteristics
described during the Nipah virus outbreaks in Malaysia
and Singapore, with most persons having fever, headache,
and an altered level of consciousness (2). In Bangladesh, a
higher proportion of patients had an altered level of con-
sciousness than those in Malaysia, although the results in
our study relied on self-reporting, and objective descrip-
tions of symptoms were not systematically documented.
The absence of antibodies to Nipah/Hendra virus in
asymptomatic persons suggests that subclinical infection
did not occur or was an uncommon event, although sub-
clinical infection has been previously documented (15,16).
Among patients with probable or confirmed cases, patients
in Naogaon tended to be younger (median age 12 years vs.
38 years of age) and to have a shorter interval from symp-
tom onset to death (4 days vs. 6 days), compared to
patients in the outbreak in Meherpur. Whether younger age
is associated with a more fulminant course is uncertain, but
the experience in Naogaon suggests that children appear to
be as susceptible to infection as adults.
We restricted our case definition to confirmed or prob-
able cases and did not include suspected cases in classifi-
cation, defined as a surviving resident with onset of fever
plus headache or altered level of consciousness, without
serologic evidence for Nipah virus infection. In Meherpur,
five nonpatients would have had suspected cases; in
Naogaon, 44 patients would have had suspected cases. In
the absence of objective clinical and serologic findings,
persons with suspected cases are more likely to be patients
with false-positive test results. On the other hand, the sen-
sitivity of the Nipah virus EIAis limited (13); determining
whether suspected cases represented true Nipah virus
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ferent clinical syndrome) is difficult. Another limitation,
especially of the Meherpur investigation, was the difficul-
ty of obtaining an accurate recollection of activities that
took place almost 2 years before the study. 
Two features of this outbreak of Nipah virus encephali-
tis are distinct from previous outbreaks. A clear history of
exposure to a specific species of animals was lacking,
although bats in the region had serologic evidence of infec-
tion, and person-to-person spread may have been an
important mode of transmission. Two independent clusters
of cases suggest that this virus may sporadically infect
humans. From January through April 2004, two new clus-
ters of fatal Nipah virus encephalitis have been reported in
Bangladesh. These outbreaks further underscore the need
for enhancing regional surveillance for Nipah virus and
clarifying transmission patterns. Also, increasing the
capacity to conduct surveillance for new cases may add to
our understanding of the disease and guide development of
effective prevention strategies.
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